Abstract. We propose a quantum key distribution protocol with quantum based user authentication. User authentication is executed by validating the correlation of GHZ states. Alice and Bob can distribute a secure key using the remaining GHZ states after authentication. This secret key does not leak even to the arbitrator by the properties of the entanglement. We will show that our protocol is secure against the cloning attack.
Introduction
Quantum Cryptography encompasses many disciplines such as Quantum key distribution, Quantum secret sharing, Quantum authentication and so on. Above all, the most characterized is Quantum key distribution (QKD). Many QKD protocols have been proposed [1] [2] [3] [4] and implemented [5] [6] [7] since Bennet and Brassard first designed a QKD protocol [1] in 1984. Unlike Classical Cryptography, QKD guarantees the provable security of distributed keys [8] [9] [10] . In spite of providing the security of a key, the main weakness of those QKD protocols is that they are vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack. In other words, an attacker, Eve, can intervene in the communication and impersonate the legitimate user since there are no concrete means of authentication.
Classical Cryptography can guarantee security, integrity and authentication on the computational basis. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [11, 12] is used for authentication. PKI is based on the difficulty of solving some problems such as the factoring problem and the discrete logarithm problem, which can be broken in polynomial time [13] using a quantum computer. Hence we need another method for safe authentication in a quantum environment.
We organize this paper as follows. First, we present an overview about authentication methods in chapter 2. Next, we propose a new QKD protocol with user authentication in chapter 3. Our QKD protocol is composed of two parts: one is authentication and the other key distribution. Greenberger -Horne -Zeilinger (GHZ) states [14] are used to authenticate users and distribute a secret key. The security analysis of our protocol is discussed in chapter 4 and at last our conclusion is presented in chapter 5.
Overview of authentication methods
Authentication is divided into two parts: one is user authentication and the other message authentication. User authentication means that any user can be identified as the claimed user if he/she is the right person. Message authentication is to confirm that the received message is not changed.
In PKI(Public Key Infrastructure), every user has his/her key pair, a public key and the corresponding secret key. CA(certificate authority) publishes the certificate of a user, which contains the name of the user, his/her public key and other parameters. Every user having a secret key and corresponding certificate can convince others that he/she is the right person. In other words, user authentication can be done by checking some information using a certificate in Classical Cryptography. On the other hand, message authentication is done by checking the hashed value of the message. In Quantum Cryptography, some quantum authentication protocols [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] have been proposed. Message authentication in quantum cryptography is done by using the previously shared entanglement. If two users share entanglement states in advance and confirm that fact, then they can convince that the message is from the other and not modified during transmission by tagging the message. User authentication is already done on the assumption, i.e. the other user is assumed legitimate when he/she has the other particle of the entanglement state [15, 16] or a shared secret sequence [17, 18] . These types of authentication have restricted applications since the communicators must share Bell states or a secret sequence in advance and keep as many sequences as the number of users whom they want to identify safe.
For safe communication, user authentication must be preceded in the procedures of quantum protocols. Some user authentication protocols [19, 21] are proposed, but they are only for authentication. We now propose a QKD protocol with user authentication. In our protocol, a trusted third party, the arbitrator, is introduced. It is because direct authentication between users requires much more effort for a user to manage and keep secret many keys or entanglement pairs between other users as mentioned above. Simply, if there are n users, then
keys are needed in direct authentication. But only n keys are necessary with the arbitrator. In this regard, direct authentication between users is not suitable for multiple users and quantum networks.
Authenticated quantum key distribution protocol
We have some assumptions for our QKD protocol. First, each user has registered his/her secret identity and one-way function to the arbitrator and keeps this information safe. Second, the public channel used for checking classical bits is open to all users and preserves the integrity of the message.
Let one communicator, Alice have a secret identity, ID A and a one-way function f A . Similarly, another user, Bob, has a secret identity ID B and a oneway hash function f B . Alice's authentication key shared with the arbitrator can be calculated as f A (ID A , c A ) and Bob's as f B (ID B , c B ) , where c A and c B are the counters of call on Alice's and Bob's hash function, respectively. We can get a new authentication key each time by changing the counter. The authentication key is used to encrypt qubits heading to the owner from the arbitrator in the distribution of GHZ particles. If Alice wants to communicate with Bob through a secure channel, she notifies the arbitrator and Bob about that. On receiving the request, the arbitrator first generates N GHZ tripartite states |Ψ = |ψ 1 ...|ψ N . For simplicity we assume that the following GHZ state |ψ i is prepared.
where the subscripts A, a and B correspond to Alice, the arbitrator, and Bob, respectively. In this paper, we represent the rectangular(z) basis as {|0 , |1 } and the diagonal(x) basis as {|+ , |− }, where |+ = (ID A , c A ) and f B (ID B , c B ) , respectively. For example, if the ith value of f A (ID A , c A )(or f B (ID B , c B ) ) is 0, then the arbitrator makes an identity operation I on Alice's (Bob's) particle of the ith GHZ state. If it is 1, Hadamard operation H is applied to Alice's (Bob's) particle. If the authentication key f A (ID A , c A )(or f B (ID B , c B ) ) does not have enough length to encrypt all GHZ particles, new authentication keys can be created by increasing the counters until the authentication keys cover all GHZ particles. After encoding the GHZ particles, the arbitrator distributes the two particles of the GHZ state to Alice and Bob and keeps the remaining for himself.
On receiving the qubits, Alice and Bob decode the qubits with their authentication keys f A (ID A , c A ) and f B (ID B , c B ), respectively. Next, Alice and Bob select some of the decoded qubits, make von-Newmann measurement on them, and compare the results through the public channel. Only Alice and Bob can calculate the authentication key used to encrypt the GHZ particles and restore the original GHZ states. By checking the correlation of the original GHZ state, Alice and Bob can authenticate each other. The three stages of GHZ states in the authentication can be summarized in the following equations.
where |ψ i is the i-th GHZ state and the subscript 1,2, and 3 represent the three steps of authentication: the GHZ state generated by the arbitrator, the encoded GHZ states with Alice's and Bob's authentication keys by the arbitrator, and the decoded GHZ states of Alice and Bob.
If the authentication fails due to a higher than expected error rate, they abort the protocol. Otherwise they do the following key distribution process: Alice and Bob randomly make an operation either identity operation I or Hadamard operation H on the remaining particles. They keep a record of used operations. For example, 0 represents I and 1 indicates H.
Bob sends his encrypted GHZ particles to Alice. On receiving the qubits, Alice makes Bell measurements on the qubits from Bob and hers. The arbitrator measures his qubits in the diagonal basis {|+ , |− } and publishes the measurement outcomes. Alice can find Bob's sequence of operations with the opened 
Alice and Bob open some bits of their shared key (Bob's operation sequence) and check the coincidence. If the error rate is higher than the acceptable level, they throw away the shared sequence and restart the protocol. Otherwise they use the unpublished sequences as a secret key. Usual error correction can be implemented to correct the remaining errors. Alice and Bob can reduce the Eve's knowledge of a shared key by standard privacy amplification [22, 23] .
Security proof
We assume that user identity and a hash function are secretly registered with the arbitrator and the identity is kept secret only between the owner and the arbitrator.
In a simple attack, if Eve intercepts the qubits transmitted to Alice or Bob from the arbitrator, then she incurs errors with probability 1/4 for each check bit in the authentication procedure because she cannot exactly know the authentication key f A (ID A , c A ) or f B (ID B , c B )) similar to the case of BB84. Hence Eve can be detected with probability of 1 − (
c where c is the number of checking bits in the process of authentication. Eve is, therefore, always detected if c is large enough. We think this is also true in the case of a more advanced attack. Alice and Bob can confirm that the opposite party of the channel is the right person designated for after authentication.
On the other hand, the original secret identities of users cannot be revealed even if Eve estimates some bits of the authentication key i.e. the hashed value. Eve can infer only some bits of the authentication key by checking bits in the authentication process. However Eve cannot reverse the hash function with partial information of the hashed value obtained from the checking bits in the authentication process. Besides Eve cannot infer the next authentication key since it is used only once and changed every time.
Suppose Eve has perfect correlation with the original GHZ states in advance and intercepts the qubits heading from Bob to Alice in the key distribution process. If Eve just measures then sends the qubit, she cannot get any information of the secret bit and she causes an error with the probability 1/2. It is because she gets 0 or 1 with probability 1/2 regardless of the message and collapses the GHZ states. On the other hand, Eve cannot find anything useful since she does not know the operation of the other qubit which is not transmitted even if she uses the cloning attack [24, 25] . Eve is exposed at least with the probability 1/4 (1/4 to Alice on the opening of Arbitrator's measurement results, 1/4 (maximally 1/2) in the last checking procedure) per check-bit. Eve can thus be revealed in two stages when Alice discovers Bob's operation and Alice and Bob check some bits of shared key.
Suppose the arbitrator becomes an eavesdropper. Let the arbitrator use two other GHZ states to be in the middle of Alice and Bob. This action of the arbitrator will be revealed with the probability 1/2 per check-bit in the authentication process. The arbitrator thus will generate other multipartite (four, five, etc) GHZ states to get some information without revealing his existence. However the arbitrator can not find out the shared secret and be detected with the probability of 1/2 per check-bit in the last procedure of the key distribution. This is because our key distribution protocol does not rely on the neutrality of the arbitrator but on the entanglement of GHZ state. In this regard, our protocol guarantees the security of the shared key against man-in the middle attacks, intercept-resend attacks and cloning attacks.
Conclusions
We propose a quantum key distribution protocol with user authentication. The arbitrator is introduced to authenticate multiple users. They can authenticate each other by checking the correlation of shared GHZ particles. Only legitimate parties can recover the original GHZ states since the qubits are encrypted by user authentication keys. Moreover, the communicators can share a secret key using the remaining qubits after authentication. Bob sends his qubits to Alice, where a Bell measurement is performed. With the Bell measurement results and the arbitrator's measurement outcomes, Alice can infer which operations Bob used. By the properties of the entanglement of GHZ states, even the arbitrator cannot find the shared secret. The shared key is secure against man-in the middle attacks, intercept-resend attacks and cloning attacks. Our protocol can also be adjusted to be incorporated in future quantum networks.
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